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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Following a jury trial, Regina Maynard was convicted of manufacturing marijuana, 
trafficking in marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, possession of 
methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, she asserts that 
that the prosecutor committed misconduct, and the district court erred when it denied 
her motion for a mistrial on this basis, when the State introduced prejudicial evidence of 
a type that the State had previously stipulated not to present to the jury; and that the 
district court erred and denied Ms. Maynard's constitutional right to confrontation when it 
precluded Ms. Maynard from asking one of the State's witnesses who was an alleged 
co-conspirator or co-defendant in her charged offenses - regarding the penalties faced 
by this witness. Ms. Maynard asserts that these errors, both individually and 
cumulatively, deprived her of her right to a fair trial and, therefore, reversal of her 
conviction is required. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Upon receiving a search warrant for her residence, police went to the home that 
Regina Maynard shared with her mother to search for evidence of drug activity at the 
home. (Trial Tr., p.185, L.25 - p.187, L.1.) Police encountered Ms. Maynard outside of 
her home, and executed the warrant. (Trial Tr., p.187, L.9 - p.189, L.2.) Inside her 
house, police discovered that two rooms of the house were devoted to growing 
marijuana plants. (Trial Tr., p.189, L.23 - p.191, L.6.) Police also found scales, a bong, 
baggies, two jars containing a "dried, leafy, green substance," and two vials containing 
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residue of a substance that ultimately tested positive for methamphetamine in a third 
room. (Trial Tr., p.304, L.10 - p.313, L.12; p.338, L.4 - p.351, L.14.) 
Ms. Maynard was charged with manufacturing marijuana, trafficking in marijuana, 
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, possession of methamphetamine, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.45-47.) Prior to trial, Ms. Maynard filed a 
series of motions in limine with the district court. (R., pp.79-81.) Among these motions 
was a request that the State be precluded from presenting any evidence regarding the 
presence of a child outside Ms. Maynard's residence at the time that the search warrant 
was served, the fact that she was pushing a baby stroller when approached by police, 
or the fact that children's toys were present within the residence. (Trial Tr., 1 p.18, Ls. 7-
19; R., pp.79-80.) 
On the day of trial, the district court took up Ms. Maynard's motions in limine, 
including her request that the district court exclude any evidence or testimony that she 
was pushing a baby stroller outside of her home at the time that police executed a 
search warrant on her home, that there were children's toys within the residence. (Trial 
Tr., p.12, Ls.12-14, p.18, Ls.7-19.) She sought to exclude this evidence as being both 
irrelevant to the State's charges, and highly prejudicial. (Trial Tr., p.18, Ls.14-19.) The 
State, in turn, argued that this evidence was part of the res gestae of the charged 
offenses because it was "part of the facts of the case." (Trial Tr., p.18, L.22 - p.22, L.7.) 
The district court initially deferred ruling on this request, but the State ultimately 
conceded the issue (although still adhering to the belief that the evidence was 
1 There are two volumes of transcripts of the proceedings in Ms. Maynard's case. The 
primary volume of transcripts contains the transcript of Ms. Maynard's trial, and is 
referred to herein as "Trial Tr." The second volume contains the transcript of the pretrial 
hearing and Ms. Maynard's sentencing hearing, and is referred to herein as "Sentencing 
Tr." 
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admissible). (Trial Tr., p.27, Ls.3-10, p.155, Ls.17-21.) The State represented to the 
district court and to Ms. Maynard that it was essentially "acquiescing" to this evidence 
not being admitted at trial; and the prosecutor stated that, accordingly, he would instruct 
his witnesses not to mention that Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller at the time 
of the search of her home or that there were children's toys within the home. (Trial 
Tr., p.155, Ls.17-21.) 
During opening statements, the prosecutor informed the jurors that Ms. Maynard 
had initially invoked her right to remain silent upon being read her Miranda2 warnings by 
police. (Trial Tr., p.175, Ls.9-12.) Specifically, the prosecutor told the jury: "You will 
hear Officer Andreoli talk to you. When he first contacted the defendant, he Mirandized 
her and advised her of her rights. She chose not to speak to him at that time." 
Trial Tr., p.175, Ls.9-12. Ms. Maynard did not object to this statement. (Trial Tr., p.175, 
Ls.9-15.) 
Officer Joseph Andreoli was the first witness presented by the State at trial. 
(Trial Tr., p.183, Ls.3-8.) Officer Andreoli was among the officers that executed the 
search warrant at Ms. Maynard's home. (Trial Tr., p.185, L.25 - p.186, L.13.) He 
testified that he instructed other officers to detain Ms. Maynard while he knocked on 
Ms. Maynard's front door to announce the officers' presence and then enter her home. 
(Trial Tr., p.188, L.25 p.189, L.24.) 
When Officer Andreoli first came into Ms. Maynard's home, he testified that he 
was "overwhelmed" by a very strong odor of marijuana. (Trial Tr., p.189, L.25 - p.190, 
L.4.) A cursory sweep of the house revealed that two of the bedrooms in this home 
were dedicated to growing what the officer believed was marijuana. (Trial Tr., p.191, 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Ls.1-6.) In addition to the plants that the officer thought were of a size, shape, and 
smell that was consistent with marijuana, Officer Andreoli also testified that there was a 
significant amount of equipment that seemed to be dedicated to the cultivation of these 
plants. (Trial Tr., p.192, Ls.4-15.) 
Officer Andreoli testified that he then went outside of the house to speak to 
Ms. Maynard. (Trial Tr., p.198, Ls.9-15.) The following exchange took place between 
the officer and the prosecutor: 
Q: Okay. And when you met with her, what, if anything, did you advise 
her, as far as your rights? 
A: I did advise her of her rights, per Miranda. 
Q: And that's a right to speak with you and to have an attorney, those 
rights? 
A: Correct. 
(DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, we are going to object as to relevance 
here. 
(PROSECUTOR]: Judge, I think it's fair that he can say that. 
(THE COURT]: Overruled. 
Q: Go ahead. 
A: Initially, she did -- well I read her her rights. She did speak to me 
momentarily, to ask me questions, and then she chose not to speak 
with me at that time. 
(Trial Tr., p.198, L.16 - p.199, L.9.) 
At two additional points during the State's direct examination of Officer Andreoli, 
the State again referenced Ms. Maynard's initial refusal to speak to police, which the 
officer characterized as having, "previously invoked her rights not to speak with me." 
(Trial Tr., p.200, Ls.24-6; p.202, L.18.) Ms. Maynard reiterated her objection that this 
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evidence was irrelevant, but the district court overruled this objection. (Trial Tr., p.202, 
Ls.19-21.) 
After Ms. Maynard eventually re-initiated contact with police, she made a series 
of admissions to Officer Andreoli. (Trial Tr., p.202, L.23 - p.207, L.8) According to the 
officer, Ms. Maynard identified the plants within the home as marijuana plants and 
further stated that the grow operation within the house was her idea in an attempt to 
minimize her mother's perceived involvement with the operation. (Trial Tr., p.203, Ls.5-
22.) 
According to his testimony, Officer Andreoli then went back inside the house and 
continued searching the living room area. (Trial Tr., p.207, Ls.9-18.) While searching 
the living room, the officer found a glass pipe; a pill bottle containing a leafy, green 
substance; and a red plastic cup that also contained a leafy, green substance. (Trial 
Tr., p.207, L.19 p.208, L.7.) In addition, the officer later went out to talk to 
Ms. Maynard again, this time about glass vials that were located in a bedroom inside 
her home. (Trial Tr., p.210, L.2 - p.211, L.15.) Ms. Maynard admitted that the vials 
were hers during this interview, and further stated that the vials contained 
methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.211, Ls.8-15.) 
Three recordings of the officer's interactions with Ms. Maynard were played for 
the jury. (Trial Tr., p.213, L.8 - p.218, L.12; Exhibit 2.) The first track was solely that 
portion of Ms. Maynard's interactions where she was non-responsive to the officer's 
questions and eventually informed the officer that she did not want to talk to him upon 
being read a Miranda warning. (Trial Tr., p.213, Ls.15-17; Exhibit 2.) At the beginning 
of the second track of this recording, the officer again spoke about the fact that 
Ms. Maynard invoked her right not to speak with police and informed Ms. Maynard that 
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she would have to verbalize that she was the one who had approached the officer to 
speak with him. (Exhibit 2.) Thereafter, Ms. Maynard made statements on this 
recording that indicated that the grow operation was her idea. (Exhibit 2.) Her 
statements regarding her own involvement were generally limited to allowing the 
operation to be conducted in her home. (Exhibit 2.) However, Ms. Maynard also stated 
on this recording that the owner of the marijuana plants had already taken most of them 
away and that the remaining plants were going to be hers. (Exhibit 2.) 
On the third recording, Officer Andreoli asked Ms. Maynard about glass vials with 
a powdery residue inside of them. (Exhibit 2.) Specifically, the officer asked her to 
identify the substance inside these vials. (Exhibit 2.) Ms. Maynard responded to the 
officer that the substance was "meth." (Exhibit 2.) 
On cross-examination, Officer Andreoli admitted that there were no items in the 
rooms where the alleged marijuana was growing inside the house that were identified 
as Ms. Maynard's possessions. (Trial Tr., p.231, Ls.14-17.) He further admitted that 
none of the equipment in these rooms was ever fingerprinted, so the officer did not 
know if Ms. Maynard's fingerprints were on any of these items. (Trial Tr., p.229, L.11 -
p.230, L.10.) Additionally, there were no marijuana plants being grown in the room 
subsequently identified as Ms. Maynard's bedroom. (Trial Tr., p.230, Ls.18-20.) 
The next witness presented by the State was Laura Weddle, 3 a law enforcement 
technician that was present for the search of Ms. Maynard's home and assisted in 
collecting evidence during this search. (Trial Tr., p.247, Ls. 7-13, p.250, Ls.17-20. She 
3 The record does not reflect whether Ms. Weddle was a police officer or what specific 
job title she may have had in her work with law enforcement officers. Accordingly, she 
is not referred to herein with regard to any particular job title. 
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testified as to her personal observations of the rooms that contained the alleged 
marijuana grow operation. (Trial Tr., p.256, L.25 - p.275, L.7.) 
In the first room, Ms. Weddle testified that she observed some cut stalks in pots, 
grow lights, and a child's wading pool that contained ten actively growing leafy, green 
plants. (Trial Tr., p.258, Ls.7-11.) She also observed plastic tubing, a watering unit and 
a fan. (Trial Tr., p.258, L.16 p.260, L.14.) On a shelf in this room, Ms. Weddle 
testified that she observed various chemicals and fertilizers, along with a fertilizing tank 
with a hose attached to it. (Trial Tr., p.262, L.9 - p.263, L.5.) 
In the second room in Ms. Maynard's home that allegedly contained an additional 
grow operation, Ms. Weddle testified that she observed stalks and buds of leafy, green 
plant material being dried on metal racks. (Trial Tr., p.270, L.8 - p.271, L.5.) She also 
testified that a grow light was present in this room as well. (Trial Tr., p.270, Ls.8-12.) In 
addition to these materials, Ms. Weddle testified that she observed 31 plants that were 
actively growing in the room, and identified these plants individually through 
photographs. (Trial Tr., p.274, L.25 - p.279, L.4.) 
Ms. Weddle was also present when police searched Ms. Maynard's bedroom. 
(Trial Tr., p.303, L.14 p.304, L.16.) She testified that she had photographed some 
items believed to be evidence within this room, including two glass vials that appeared 
to contain residue of some substance. (Trial Tr., p.304, L.1 O - p.307, L.6.) Ms. Weddle 
testified that she also observed what appeared to be a ledger listing expenses, a bong, 
a "shake box," two scales, rolling papers, and jars and a cup containing a leafy green 
substance inside it. (Trial Tr., p.308, L.2 - p.311, L.15, p.312, L.4 - p.313, L.12.) In 
addition to these items, Ms. Weddle testified that she observed a letter addressed to 
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Ms. Maynard within this bedroom that reflected the address of her home. (Trial 
Tr., p.311, Ls.18-21.) 
Following the testimony of Ms. Weddle, the State called Corina Owsley to the 
stand. (Trial Tr., p.334, Ls.9-13.) Ms. Owsley was employed with the Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services in its drug chemistry section, and tested several of the items 
collected from Ms. Maynard's home in this capacity. (Trial Tr., p.334, Ls.14-16.) She 
testified that she performed testing on both glass vials that were recovered from 
1\/ls. Maynard's bedroom, and that, in her expert opinion, these vials contained residue 
of methamphetamine in light of the results of her testing. (Trial Tr., p.338, L.5 - p.351, 
L.14.) 
The State then asked Ms. Owsley about State's Exhibit 14 - which was 
apparently a large digital scale that was recovered from Ms. Maynard's home. (Trial 
Tr., p.352, L.25 - p.355, L.17; see also Exhibit List.)4 According to Ms. Owsley's 
testimony, testing of residue found on this scale revealed the presence of resins of 
marijuana. (Trial Tr., p.355, L.12 - p.356, L.2.) Testing of the smaller scale recovered 
from l'v1s. Maynard's home also tested positive for resins of marijuana and for 
methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.356, L.17 - p.358, L. 23.) 
Officer Gee Bourgeau of the Boise Police Department was the next witness 
presented by the State. (Trial Tr., p.370, Ls.9-14.) He also participated in the search of 
Ms. Maynard's home. (Trial Tr., p.371, Ls.10-19.) Officer Bourgeau characterized his 
role in the search as that of a "finder," i.e., he was looking for evidence. (Trial 
4 The actual digital scale is among the physical exhibits that were retained by the district 
court rather than being forwarded to the Idaho Supreme Court in this appeal. (See R., 
p.254.) The district court's reference of this exhibit is consistent with Idaho Law. I.A.R. 
31 (a)(1 ). 
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Tr., p.371, Ls.20-23.) The officer testified that, when he entered Ms. Maynard's home, 
he was immediately struck by the strong odor of marijuana inside the house. (Trial 
Tr., p.372, Ls.12-24.) 
Officer Bourgeau then proceeded to search Ms. Maynard's bedroom. (Trial 
Tr., p.374, L.11 - p.375, L.13.) He began his search with the closet in the bedroom. 
(Trial Tr., p.375, L.22 - p.376, L.2.) As he pulled a pair of pants off the top shelf, Officer 
Bourgeau testified that a glass vial fell out and landed on the floor. (Trial Tr., p.376, 
L.21 - p.377, L.5.) The officer then turned to a small nightstand that had a jewelry box 
on it. (Trial Tr., p.379, L.12 - p.380, L.2.) Officer Bourgeau testified that another glass 
vial was contained within a drawer in the jewelry box. (Trial Tr., p.380, Ls.3-9.) 
According to his testimony, the officer also found a bong, a shake box, two scales, 
rolling papers, and a baggie containing a leafy, green substance among other items in 
this room. (Trial Tr., p.384, L.14 - p.394, L.18.) 
After Officer Bourgeau testified, the State called Detective Kevin Holtry to the 
stand. (Trial Tr., p.408, L.22 - p.409, L.2.) As with the other officers, Detective Holtry 
was present for the search of Ms. Maynard's home. (Trial Tr., p.415, Ls.22-23.) 
However, during the course of his testimony, this officer mentioned the exact evidence 
that the prosecutor had previously assured the court would not be offered during 
Ms. Maynard's trial - testimony that Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller at the 
time that she was initially contacted by police immediately prior to the search. (Trial 
Tr., p.416, Ls.9-14.) 
Upon contacting Ms. Maynard, the officer identified himself as a police officer and 
explained to her that the police had a search warrant for her home. (Trial Tr., p.417, 
Ls.12-18.) After talking briefly to Ms. Maynard, Detective Holtry then entered her home 
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to assist in the search. (Trial Tr., p.418, Ls.19-21.) He testified that he smelled both 
fresh and burnt marijuana when he entered the home. (Trial Tr., p.419, L.17 - p.420, 
L.7.) 
According to his testimony, Detective Holtry was assigned to search one of the 
two grow rooms - what was marked on State's Exhibit 3 as "Bedroom A." (Trial 
Tr., p.420, Ls.8-21.) The detective testified that he observed what he believed to be an 
"active grow" operation in this room - the room contained grow lights, reflective paneling 
on the walls, timers, a carbon dioxide sensor, plant food and fertilizers, and a number of 
green plants contained within a child's pool in the room. (Trial Tr., p.420, L.17 - p.421, 
L.9, p.426, L.5 - p.427, L.1.) Detective Holtry further testified that there were additional 
pots within the room that appeared to contain just stems where other plant material had 
been cut off. (Trial Tr., p.422, L.17 - p.423, L.13.) 
Following the testimony of Detective Holtry, Ms. Maynard made a motion for a 
mistrial on the basis of the detective's testimony that Ms. Maynard was seen pushing a 
baby stroller outside of her house immediately before police discovered a marijuana 
grow operation inside of her home. (Trial Tr., p.447, L.23 - p.448, L.13.) The State, in 
response, acknowledged that the detective had been instructed the previous day not to 
mention this evidence in his testimony, but speculated that the officer may have "forgot" 
this instruction. (Trial Tr., p.448, Ls.15-19.) 
Ms. Maynard, through counsel, attempted to lay a record as to the visible 
reaction of the jurors to this information. (Trial Tr., p.455, Ls.2-25.) However, the 
district court denied the motion for a mistrial. (Trial Tr., p.452, L.16 - p.455, L.1.) The 
court found that the testimony was presented based upon an inadvertent mistake on the 
part of the detective, that the testimony merely related a statement of fact, and that the 
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testimony was not so prejudicial as to have deprived Ms. Maynard of her right to a fair 
trial. (Trial Tr., p.453, L.17 - p.455, L.1.) 
Following the denial of Ms. Maynard's motion for a mistrial, the State called 
Detective Clay Christensen to the stand. (Trial Tr., p.458, Ls.5-11.) As with many of 
the other officers who testified at trial, the detective testified that, upon entry in 
Ms. Maynard's home to execute the search warrant, he smelled a strong odor of 
marijuana. (Trial Tr., p.462, L.14 - p.463, L.19.) Detective Christensen assisted in the 
search of one of the grow rooms in the house, and testified as to the various plants he 
observed growing in this room, along with various other items that the officer believed 
were used in the cultivation of marijuana. (Trial Tr., p.464, L.5 - p.476, L.4.) 
Thereafter, the State recalled Ms. Owsley to the stand to testify regarding the 
results of the testing of the leafy green plants that were collected as evidence by the 
State. (Trial Tr., p.512, L.20 - p.515, L.5.) According to her testimony, the evidence of 
the plant material sent in by the State tested positive as marijuana. (Trial Tr., p.529, 
L.17-p.535, L.11.) 
In addition to this testimony, the State presented the testimony of an employee 
from the Idaho Power Company, Kelly Stansell, who was a records custodian for 
records regarding the power usage of the company's customers over time. (Trial 
Tr., p.556, L.3 - p.559, L.2.) This employee testified that a comparison between 
Ms. Maynard's power usage in July of 2010 with that of the previous year showed much 
greater power usage around the time that the marijuana was discovered in her home. 
(Trial Tr., p.564, L.14 - p.567, L.18.) 
Juliette McKay was the next witness on behalf of the State. (Trial Tr., p.588, 
Ls.18-21.) Ms. McKay worked at the Ada County jail as a Central Control Supervisor. 
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(Trial Tr., p.588, L.22 - p.589, L.4.) In this capacity, Ms. McKay administered the phone 
system at the jail. (Trial Tr., p.589, Ls.5-7.) Ms. McKay testified that all of the calls 
made by inmates at the jail were recorded; and that each inmate was assigned a law 
enforcement number, and then selected their own personal information number {PIN) in 
order to track which inmates were making the calls. {Trial Tr., p.590, L.9 p.591, L.13.) 
During the State's questioning of Ms. McKay, she testified that two recordings of phone 
calls that Ms. McKay testified were made using Ms. Maynard's law enforcement number 
and PIN. (Trial Tr., p.594, L.9-p.599, L.14, p.600, Ls.13-16; Exhibit 18.) 
The State then called Ms. Maynard's mother, Christine Maynard, as a witness. 
(Trial Tr., p.606, L.23 - p.606, L.7.) Christine Maynard testified that she had lived with 
her daughter and that Ms. Maynard had approached her and told her that Ms. Maynard 
had a friend who wanted to use their home to store a marijuana grow operation in 
exchange for paying some of the household bills for Ms. Maynard and her mother. 
(Trial Tr., p.608, L. 10 - p.611, L.7.) In addition, Christine Maynard testified that a small 
amount of the marijuana that was to be grown in their house was supposed to be left 
over for the two women for their own personal use. (Trial Tr., p.612, Ls.6-9.) 
During the direct examination conducted by the State, Christine Maynard 
revealed that she was facing criminal charges herself based upon the marijuana that 
was found growing in the home she shared with Ms. Maynard. (Trial Tr., p.613, Ls.13-
17.) She also testified that both she and Ms. Maynard had been unemployed for a 
significant amount of time prior to entering into this agreement, which prompted them to 
agree to grow marijuana within their home. (Trial Tr., p.619, Ls.6-20.) Christine 
Maynard denied that she had received any promise of leniency with regard to her own 
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criminal charges based upon her testifying for the State, and further denied that she had 
any personal hope of such leniency. (Trial Tr., p.613, L.24 - p.614, L.9.) 
The State then asked Christine Maynard if she was familiar with the sound of her 
daughter's voice on the telephone, and if she could recognize Ms. Maynard's voice over 
the phone. (Trial Tr., p.635, Ls.13-19.) Christine Maynard indicated that she could do 
so. (Trial Tr., p.635, Ls.13-19.) The State then played the recordings of the phone 
conversations that Ms. McKay had previously testified were recordings of calls made 
using Ms. Maynard's law enforcement number and PII\J. (Trial Tr., p.635, L.23 - p.637, 
L.23.) Christine Maynard testified that it was her daughter's voice on the recordings, 
along with the voice of an unknown male. (Trial Tr., p.636, Ls.15-18.) 
On the first phone call contained on this recording, the unknown male can be 
heard to mention weights and manufacturing. (Exhibit 18.) The voice identified as 
Ms. Maynard's by her mother stated that she was "stupid" in response to the male's 
remarks about the seriousness of the charges. (Exhibit 18.) Ms. Maynard also stated 
that she was facing these charges because she was "just trying to make some money." 
(Exhibit 18.) On the second recording, the individual identified as Ms. Maynard can be 
heard to say that she wasn't thinking straight in light of the "huge amount of money" that 
was being offered to her. (Exhibit 18.) She also referenced that the other person with 
whom she entered into the agreement had offered to pay her power bill in exchange for 
housing the grow operation. (Exhibit 18.) After these recordings were played for the 
jury, the trial court instructed the jurors that they could not consider any of the 
unidentified male's statements for proof of any of the matters that he asserted. (Trial 
Tr., p.637, L.25 - p.638, L.5.) 
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On cross examination, Ms. Maynard sought to explore the issue of Christine 
Maynard's potential bias, interest, or motive to slant her testimony in favor of the State 
in light of the serious charges that she was facing. (Trial Tr., p.640, L.23 - p.644, L.3.) 
However, pursuant to the State's objection, the district court refused to allow Ms. 
Maynard to question Christine Maynard regarding the nature of these charges and the 
penalties Christine Maynard could possibly receive as a result. (Trial Tr., p.640, L.23 -
p.645, L.4.) Christine Maynard did admit during cross-examination that she had not 
observed her daughter directly participate in the cultivation of the marijuana plants. 
(Trial Tr., p.650, Ls.1-14.) 
Ms. Maynard elected to testify on her own behalf. (Trial Tr., p.671, Ls.15-18.) 
She testified that, during the summer of 2010, she had been unemployed after a period 
of only sporadic work immediately prior. (Trial Tr., p.672, L.4 - p.673, L.9.) She also 
testified that her mother was living with her at that time. (Trial Tr., p.673, Ls.14-18.) 
Ms. Maynard testified that she met a man named Freddy Senkbeil when she responded 
to an ad he placed on Craig's list and agreed to clean one of his homes. (Trial 
Tr., p.673, L.19 - p.675, L.7.) While cleaning this home, Ms. Maynard testified that she 
observed a marijuana grow operation inside. (Trial Tr., p.675, Ls.10-12.) During the 
summer of 2010, Ms. Maynard asserted that Mr. Senkbeil approached her with a 
proposal to move the grow operation to her own home. (Trial Tr., p.675, L.20 p.676, 
L.6.) In exchange, Mr. Senkbeil offered to catch Ms. Maynard up on her unpaid bills 
and rent. (Trial Tr., p.676, Ls.7-20.) Ms. Maynard admitted that she was aware that the 
operation in question was a marijuana grow operation. (Trial Tr., p.677, Ls.2-7.) 
In order to allow him to access these plants, Ms. Maynard testified that she also 
gave Mr. Senkbeil a key to her house. (Trial Tr., p.679, Ls.14-17.) She also admitted 
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that some of the marijuana that was being grown was supposed to be given to her after 
the grow operation was completed. (Trial Tr., p. 712, L.24 - p.713, L.2.) However, 
Ms. Maynard denied that she ever directly assisted Mr. Senkbeil in setting up the grow 
operation or in the actual cultivation of the marijuana plants. (Trial Tr., p.680, Ls.3-7, 
p.682, Ls.1-22.) 
Ms. Maynard was convicted of manufacturing marijuana, trafficking in marijuana, 
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, possession of methamphetamine, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. (Trial Tr., p.825, L.12 - p.826, L.13; R., pp.209-210.) 
She was sentenced to five years, with two years fixed, for trafficking in marijuana; five 
years indeterminate for manufacturing marijuana; five years, with two years fixed, for 
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver; seven years, with two years fixed, for 
possession of methamphetamine; and one year for possession of drug paraphernalia. 
(Sentencing Tr., p.23, L.21 - p.24, L.16; R., pp.228-229.) Ms. Maynard's sentences for 
trafficking in marijuana and manufacturing marijuana were ordered to run consecutively, 
with her remaining sentences running concurrently with her sentence for trafficking. 
(Sentencing Tr., p.23, L.21 - p.24, L.16; R., pp.228-229.) This left Ms. Maynard with an 
aggregate sentence of ten years with two years fixed. Ms. Maynard timely appeals from 
her judgment of conviction and sentences. (R., p.233.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when it introduced prejudicial evidence of 
a type that the State had previously stipulated not to introduce to the jury, and did 
the district court err when it denied Ms. Maynard's motion for a mistrial that was 
prompted by this misconduct? 
2. Did the district court err when it precluded Ms. Maynard from cross-examining 
one of the State's key witnesses about the potential penalties of the criminal 
charges that witness was currently facing? 
3. Does the cumulative effect of these errors require reversal in this case? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When It Introduced Prejudicial Evidence Of A 
Type That The State Had Previously Stipulated Not To Introduce To The Jury, And The 
District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Maynard's Motion For A Mistrial That Was 
Prompted By This Misconduct 
A Introduction 
The State in this case stipulated that it would refrain from presenting evidence 
that Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller outside of her home when she was 
initially confronted by police. This stipulation was in response to Ms. Maynard's 
objections that this evidence was both prejudicial and irrelevant to her charges trial. 
Despite this stipulation, a police officer testifying on behalf of the State offered this 
precise testimony. Ms. Maynard asserts that this constituted misconduct, and that the 
district court erred when it denied her motion for a mistrial on the basis of this 
misconduct. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because Ms. Maynard objected at trial to the State's presentation of testimony 
that it had previously stipulated would not be presented to the jury, Ms. Maynard only 
has the duty to prove that misconduct occurred, "at which point the State has the 
burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). 
C. The State Committed Misconduct When It Introduced Prejudicial Evidence Of 
The Exact Type That It Had Previously Stipulated Not To Offer 
At trial, contrary to the State's stipulation that it would not present such evidence, 
Detective Holtry testified before the jury that Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller 
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outside of her house at the time she was initially contacted by police immediately prior 
to the search of her home. (Trial Tr., p.416, Ls.9-14.) Following the detective's 
testimony, Ms. Maynard asserted that the presentation of this evidence in contravention 
of the State's stipulation was improper and, further, made a motion for a mistrial on the 
basis of the erroneous presentation of this evidence. (Trial Tr., p.447, L.23 - p.448, 
L.13.) Ms. Maynard asserts that presentation of this testimony, elicited from a police 
officer who was testifying on behalf of the State, was misconduct and that the district 
court erred when it denied her motion for a mistrial on this basis. 
The prosecutor in this case stipulated that he would not present certain evidence, 
that including evidence that Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller when first 
encountered by police outside her home. (Trial Tr., p.155, Ls.17-21.) Detective Holtry 
was, according to the representations of the prosecutor, personally told not to mention 
the baby stroller during his testimony. (Trial Tr., p.448, Ls.18-19.) Despite this, the 
detective directly contravened the State's stipulation and testified to this prejudicial fact 
at Ms. Maynard's trial. (Trial Tr., p.416, Ls.9-14.) Ms. Maynard asserts that this 
constituted misconduct that resulted in a violation of her right to a fair trial. 
Prosecutors, just as any other attorneys before the court, owe a duty of candor to 
the tribunal and a duty of truthfulness to others. See, e.g., I.R.P.C. 3.3, 4.1. 
Additionally, prosecutors owe a specific duty to defendants in a criminal case to ensure 
fairness in the proceedings. As was noted by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant 
has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to 
the jury. They should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far 
they can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing 
they transgress upon the rights of the accused." Prosecutorial misconduct 
includes asking questions where the answer is inadmissible, but the jury 
can infer what the answer would have been simply from the question 
asked. 
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State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 
In this case, the prosecution provided assurances to the district court and 
Ms. Maynard that the State would not introduce any evidence that she was pushing a 
baby stroller when initially confronted by police. This was directly in response to 
Ms. Maynard's repeated assertions that this evidence was both irrelevant and highly 
prejudicial. However, the State did not abide by its assurances, as Detective Holtry 
testified as to exactly these matters at trial. 
For purposes of this Court's misconduct analysis, it is of no moment that the 
prosecutor in this case did not seek to directly elicit this testimony from Detective Holtry. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Ellington made it clear that, where the witness 
testifying on behalf of the State is a police officer, any response made by such officer is 
attributed to the State for purposes of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. State v. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 61 (2011 ). In Ellington, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, 
"when an officer of the State gives any unsolicited testimony that is gratuitous and 
prejudicial to the defendant, that testimony will be imputed to the State for the purposes 
of determining prosecutorial misconduct." Id. The rationale for such a rule is that to do 
otherwise would undermine the purposes behind the prohibition against prosecutorial 
misconduct by superficially shifting the blame to another party who is, him- or herself, 
likewise a representative of the State. Id. Moreover, police officers, as representatives 
of the State, owe the defendant the same duty as prosecutors not to present improper 
testimony with the intent of securing a conviction. Id. 
Accordingly, because the improper response of Detective Holtry is attributed to 
the State for purposes of determining whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and 
because this testimony was both improper and brought in contravention of the State's 
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express agreement not to present this evidence, the introduction of evidence that 
Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller when confronted by police was misconduct. 
Moreover, contrary to the State's assertions, any evidence regarding whether 
Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller at the time that police first encountered her 
was not part of the res gestae of the charged offenses, was entirely irrelevant to the 
State's charges and, therefore, should never have been presented to the jury. Under 
the rules of evidence, relevant evidence is generally admissible and, as a corollary, 
irrelevant evidence generally is not. See I.R.E. 402. "Relevant evidence" is defined as 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." I. R.E. 401 (emphasis added). While evidence that Ms. Maynard 
was pushing a baby stroller at the time she was accosted by police is prejudicial, this 
evidence was entirely irrelevant to the charges that were levied by the State, as this 
evidence in no way makes any fact of consequence to the action either more or less 
probable. 
Additionally, this evidence would not, contrary to the State's assertions at trial, 
fall within the parameters of the res gestae of the charged offense. Although the term 
is, at times, used flexibly, res gestae is generally defined as "the whole transaction 
under investigation and every part of it." State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17 (Ct. App. 
1994) (quoting BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6th Ed. 1990)). 
Res gestae refers to events or occurrences that are so related and have such 
relevance to the charged offense that they complete, "the story of the crime on trial by 
placing it in the context of nearby and nearly contemporaneous happenings." See 
State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17-18 (Ct. App. 1994). Generally, evidence should 
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be admitted to show res gestae only when "the charged act and the uncharged act are 
so inseparably connected that the jury cannot be given a rational and complete 
presentation of the alleged crime without reference to the uncharged 
misconduct." Id. at 19 (emphasis added). Accordingly, evidence does not fall within 
the category of the res gestae of the charged offense unless these near-contemporary 
occurrences are actually and directly relevant to the charges at trial themselves. 
The articulation of the res gestae principle given in Washington v. State, 118 
So.2d 650, 653 (Fla. App. 1960), is particularly helpful on this point: 
"Res Gestae," is a Latin term translated literally as "things done"; and it 
embraces circumstances, facts, and declarations which are incident to the 
main facts in the transaction and which are necessary to demonstrate 
its character. It also includes words, declarations, and acts so closely 
connected with a main fact in issue as to constitute part of the transaction. 
Washington, 118 So.2d at 653 (emphasis added). 
The fact that Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller at the time she was 
initially encountered by police does not fall within the res gestae of the drug charges she 
was facing. The jury, in absence of the information of the baby stroller, would not be left 
with the type of evidentiary gap that could create any confusion for the jurors and this 
information likewise did not make the State's allegations of drug offenses any more or 
less likely in any fashion. This evidence was simply irrelevant to Ms. Maynard's 
charges and the introduction of this evidence prejudiced her at trial. 
D. The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Maynard's Motion For A Mistrial On 
The Basis Of This Misconduct 
A motion for a mistrial is controlled by I.C.R. 29.1, which provides that, "[a] 
mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the 
trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the 
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courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair 
trial." I.C.R. 29.1 (a); State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1996). The decision 
whether to grant a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the district court and, 
absent an abuse of discretion, it will not be disturbed on appeal. Id.; State v. Atkinson, 
124 Idaho 816, 818 (Ct. App. 1993). The Supreme Court has held that the question on 
review is not whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion under the 
circumstances existing when the motion was made; but, whether the event or events 
which brought about the motion for mistrial constitute reversible error when viewed in 
the context of the entire record. Id. 
In cases where juries have been exposed to extraneous information or other 
improper influences, the Idaho Supreme Court has followed an approach similar to the 
approach adopted by the federal courts and declined to require a determination of 
actual prejudice. Roll v. City of Middleton, 115 Idaho 833, 837 (Ct. App. 1989). These 
courts have generally held that if the trial judge finds that the extraneous information 
reasonably could have resulted in prejudice a new trial should be ordered. Id. 
Consequently, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that the proper standard is 
whether prejudice reasonably could have occurred, rather than whether prejudice 
actually has occurred. Id. The Court's holding relies on two considerations: 
First, the extreme rigor of an actual prejudice test would severely restrict 
the availability of relief for misconduct, thereby diminishing public 
confidence in the jury system and eroding the fundamental principle that a 
"verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial." United 
States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir.1975) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 
366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)). Second, Rule 606(b), I.R.E., precludes a full 
inquiry into actual prejudice. As mentioned above, Rule 606(b) bars jurors 
from giving evidence concerning their mental processes. Because jurors 
cannot be questioned as to whether they were in fact prejudiced by 
extraneous information, the trial judge must determine whether the 
information reasonably could have produced prejudice, when evaluated in 
light of all the events and the evidence at trial. 
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Id. Therefore, it is sufficient for the judge to merely determine whether prejudice 
reasonably could have occurred. Id. at 839. In making this determination, courts must 
give due regard to "the policy of assuring that jury verdicts are based upon the evidence 
at trial, not upon extraneous information or improper influences." Id. 
The evidence that was improperly presented to the jury in this case, i.e. that 
Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller right outside of her home immediately prior to 
its search by police and the subsequent discovery of an extensive marijuana grow 
operation inside the home, could have reasonably resulted in prejudice in this case. 
Upon hearing this evidence, the jurors would naturally conclude that Ms. Maynard had 
exposed a small child to an environment where drugs were being grown, and this would 
likely incite the passions and prejudice of the jurors. This is the type of evidence that 
could have therefore prevented the jury from engaging in a rational consideration of the 
evidence, and would tend to induce the jury to render its decision based upon factors 
outside of the evidence. 
Moreover, Ms. Maynard, through counsel, made a record as to the apparent 
reactions of the jurors to this information at trial. Defense counsel informed the court 
that Ms. Maynard's father, who was present in the courtroom at the time, saw a visible 
reaction from the jury panel. (Trial Tr., p.455, Ls.5-7.) In addition, defense counsel 
noted that it appeared that one of the jurors was herself pregnant, which could increase 
the emotional impact of this evidence on that juror. (Trial Tr., p.455, Ls.18-21.) Given 
the inflammatory nature of the evidence that was presented by the State, coupled with 
the record made of the responses of the jurors to this evidence, Ms. Maynard submits 
that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for a mistrial on the basis of the 
testimony of Detective Holtry. 
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11. 
The District Court Erred When It Precluded Ms. Maynard From Cross-Examining One 
Of The State's Witnesses About The Potential Penalties Of The Criminal Charges That 
Witness Was Currently Facing 
A Introduction 
Ms. Maynard asserts that the district court erred, and further violated her 
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her, when the court ruled that she 
could not cross-examine Christine Maynard regarding the potential penalties she was 
then facing at the time she testified on behalf of the State. The district court tendered 
this ruling under the apparent belief that evidence of the potential penalty for an offense 
is never admissible at trial. However, because this evidence tended to show motive, 
bias, and prejudice of one of the State's key witnesses, it was admissible both as a key 
component of Ms. Maynard's constitutional right of confrontation, and under the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Constitutional issues are questions of law over which Idaho's appellate courts 
exercise free review. City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 (2006). 
On the other hand, the standard of review applicable to the admission of 
evidence under Idaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 are as follows: 
Separate standards of review apply to issues of admissibility of 
evidence under Idaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. We freely review 
questions of relevancy under LR. 401 because relevancy is a question 
of law. On the question of whether the evidence's probative value is 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudicial impact, however, we will 
overturn the trial court's decision only for abuse of discretion. Where a 
matter is committed to the discretion of the trial court, we conduct a three-
tiered inquiry on appeal. We consider whether: (1) the lower court rightly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within 
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
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standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
State v. Waddle, 125 Idaho 526, 528 (Ct. App. 1994) (internal citations omitted). 
C. The District Court Erred, And Violated Ms. Maynard's Constitutional Right To 
Confront The Witnesses Against Her, When It Precluded Ms. Maynard From 
Cross-Examining One Of The State's Witnesses About The Potential Penalties 
Of The Criminal Charges That Witness Was Currently Facing 
Ms. Maynard's mother, Christine Maynard, was questioned by the State at trial 
regarding the fact that she was then facing pending criminal charges at the time of 
testifying against Ms. Maynard at trial. (Trial Tr., p.613, Ls.13-17.) However, the nature 
of the charges she was facing, along with the potential penalties of these charges, was 
never disclosed to the jury. (Trial Tr., p.613, L.13 - p.616, L.6.) Ms. Maynard sought to 
impeach Christine Maynard with the potential penalties Christine Maynard could be 
facing in light of the nature of her own charges that were pending in order to show 
motive, interest, or bias in presenting testimony favorable to the State. (Trial Tr., p.640, 
L.23 - p.644, L.3.) Despite her express invocation of her right to confront the witnesses 
against her, the district court simply ruled that any evidence as to the potential penalties 
of a criminal offense could not be explored. (Trial Tr., p.644, L.17 - p.645, L.4.) 
Because Ms. Maynard's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her 
contains, at its core, the right to cross-examine the State's witnesses as to grounds of 
potential motive or bias, Ms. Maynard asserts that the district court's ruling was error. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that every 
criminal defendant has "the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.''5 
5 Since the right to confrontation is deemed to be a fundamental right, it is applicable to 
the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965). 
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U.S. CONST. Amend. VI. This right necessarily includes the right to cross-examine 
witnesses: 
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the 
opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands 
confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of 
being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which 
cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and 
obtaining immediate answers. 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 1395, 
p.123 (3d ed. 1940)). 
In discussing a defendant's right to cross-examination under the confrontation 
clause, the United States Supreme Court has described it as the right to have "an 
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not [the right to] cross-examination that is 
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." 
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19 (1985) (emphasis in original). The Court has 
repeatedly recognized that such an "opportunity for effective cross-examination" 
includes the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses on matters relating to the biases, 
prejudices, and ulterior motives that might color the witness's testimony against the 
accused. 
In Davis v. Alaska, for example, the defendant, charged with burglary for 
breaking into a bar and grand larceny for allegedly stealing a safe from that bar, wished 
to cross-examine a critical prosecution witness (whose testimony had placed the 
defendant, with "something like a crowbar" in his hands, near the location where the 
abandoned safe was had been discovered) regarding the fact that that witness, who 
apparently lived nearby, was on juvenile probation for having committed two prior 
burglaries. Davis, 415 U.S. at 309-11. The defendant's argument was that such cross-
examination would reveal two motives for the witness to have misidentified the 
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defendant: (1) to shift suspicion away from himself; and/or (2) to give the appearance of 
cooperating with the police and, thus, avoid a retaliatory probation revocation. Id. at 
311. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the state trial court had violated the 
defendant's right to confrontation by precluding the defendant's desired cross-
exa mination: 
We cannot speculate as to whether the jury, as sole judge of the 
credibility of a witness, would have accepted this line of reasoning had 
counsel been permitted to fully present it. But we do conclude that the 
jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them 
so that they could make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on 
[the witness's] testimony which provided "a crucial link in the proof ... of 
petitioner's act." Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S., at 419, 85 S.Ct., at 1077. 
The accuracy and truthfulness of [the witness's] testimony were key 
elements in the State's case against petitioner. The claim of bias which 
the defense sought to develop was admissible to afford a basis for an 
inference of undue pressure because of Green's vulnerable status as a 
probationer, cf Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 
L.Ed. 624 (1931), as well as of Green's possible concern that he might be 
a suspect in the investigation. 
Id. at 317-18 (footnote omitted). 
Later, in Delaware v. Van Arsda/1, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), the Court reaffirmed its 
holding from Davis. In Van Arsda/1, the defendant had sought to impeach the testimony 
of a prosecution witness by cross-examining that witness about the fact that a criminal 
charge against him had been dismissed after he had agreed to speak to the prosecutor 
about the defendant's case; however, the defendant's proposed cross-examination had 
been barred by the trial court based on Delaware Rule of Evidence 403.6 Id. at 676-77. 
The Supreme Court held that the defendant's right to confrontation had been violated 
because "a jury might reasonably have found" that the government's dismissal of the 
6 The version of Delaware Rule of Evidence 403 then in effect was substantively 
identical to the current version of Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. (Compare Van Arsda/1, 
475 U.S. at 676-77 n.2 (quoting the Delaware Rule) with I.R.E. 403.) 
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pending criminal charge "furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in 
his testimony .... " Id. at 679. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals, adhering to Davis and Van Arsda/1, has likewise 
recognized that such an "opportunity for effective cross-examination" includes the right 
to cross-examine adverse witnesses on matters relating to any biases, prejudices, and 
ulterior motives that might color their testimony against the accused. See, e.g., State v. 
Harshbarger, 139 Idaho 287, 293-94 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding a confrontation clause 
violation where the district court precluded the defendant from cross-examining a 
government witness regarding felony charges against that witness that had been 
reduced to misdemeanors and eventually dismissed altogether because exploration of 
that topic could have raised an inference that the witness testified favorably for the State 
based on her implied understanding or expectation of what would happen with regard to 
her own case); State v. Green, 136 Idaho 553, 556-57 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding a 
confrontation clause violation where the district court precluded the defendant from 
cross-examining a government witness regarding a felony charge pending against that 
witness because the existence of the charge provided some motivation for the witness 
to testify to the State's liking). 
At their core, each of these holdings recognize that the right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses encompasses the right not only to ask whether the witness 
was biased, but to explore and make a full record as to why the witness may be biased 
or otherwise motivated to shade their testimony in favor of the State. See Davis, 415 
U.S. at 318. In this case, the seriousness and nature of the charges that Christine 
Maynard was facing was critical information that could have easily provided a powerful 
motive for her to seek to provide testimony that would be favorable to the State. 
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Because of this, Ms. Maynard had a constitutional right to explore this as a potential 
ground of impeachment during her cross-examination of Christine Maynard at trial. 
D. The District Court Erred, And Violated The Idaho Rules Of Evidence, When It 
Precluded Ms. Maynard From Cross-Examining One Of The State's Key 
Witnesses Regarding That Witness's Potenial Bias, Prejudice, And Motive For 
Testifying On Behalf Of The State 
Similarly, because the evidence that Ms. Maynard sought to cross-examine her 
mother on was relevant to the issue of Christine Maynard's potential motive, bias, or 
interest in providing testimony favorable to the State, this evidence was admissible 
pursuant to the Rule of Evidence as well. However, the district court in this case 
appears to have labored under the misperception that all evidence of the potential 
penalties of an offense is always inadmissible at trial. (Trial Tr., p.643, Ls.8-24.) 
Ms. Maynard submits that this was error on the part of the trial court, and that the Idaho 
Supreme Court Opinion in State v. Ruiz is dispositive on this point. 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence govern the admission of all evidence in the trial 
courts of Idaho. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471 (2010). As a general principle, all 
relevant evidence is admissible at trial unless otherwise expressly precluded by these 
rules. See I.R. 402. Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 provides that "relevant evidence" is 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." 1.R.E. 401. 
Under this standard, allegations of criminal conduct against the State's 
witnesses, as well as any agreements that might exist between those witnesses and the 
State with relation to those allegations of criminal conduct, constitute "relevant 
evidence" under Rule 401 because they make it less probable that the State's witness is 
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credible - a fact which is always of consequence to the determination of the action. 
See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 137 Idaho 671, 675 (2002) (finding to be relevant the fact 
that two government witnesses had grown marijuana and the government may have 
promised not to prosecute them in exchange for their cooperation in the case against 
the defendant); cf., e.g., Davis, 415 U.S. at 316 (in the context of the Constitutional right 
to confrontation, holding that "[t]he partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, 
and is 'always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his 
testimony"') (quoting 3A J. Wigmore, evidence§ 940, p.775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)). 
In addition, the district court in this case failed to conduct the necessary 
balancing test pursuant to I.RE. 403 prior to excluding the evidence that Ms. Maynard 
sought to elicit through cross-examination. Faced with nearly identical facts as are 
present in this case, the Idaho Supreme Court has held this is error. Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 
471. 
In Ruiz, like this case, the State presented the testimony of a witness who was 
faced with the same charges as the defendant based upon their joint involvement in 
drug activity. Id. at 470. And like this case, the trial court in Ruiz precluded the 
defendant from questioning this witness regarding the potential penalties that the 
witness faced for these charges at the time of his testimony. Id. The defendant in Ruiz 
challenged the exclusion of this evidence on grounds of both his constitutional right of 
confrontation and because the exclusion of this evidence was contrary to the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. Id. at 470-471. 
The Ruiz Court held that the failure of the trial court to conduct a proper analysis 
pursuant to I.R.E. 403 was dispositive. Id. at 471. Specifically, the Court held that, 
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because the trial court, ''excluded the evidence without conducting the analysis required 
by Rule 403, the district court erred." Id. at 471. This Court should do the same. 
Moreover, while the trial court in this case ruled that it had already determined 
that the issue of potential penalties could not be presented to the jury, the court failed to 
recognize that this ruling came in the context of discussing the potential sentence that 
Ms. Maynard was directly facing as a result of the charges at trial - not the potential 
penalties faced by any other witness who may have a motive to shade their testimony in 
light of the State given their own criminal charges. (Trial Tr., p.28, Ls.16-6; p.643, 
Ls.23-24.) Because the trial court in this case never conducted the proper weighing test 
regarding the admissibility of evidence of the nature of the charges and penalties faced 
by Christine Maynard as it related to her potential motives in presenting testimony for 
the State, the district court erred in categorically excluding this evidence at trial. 
111. 
The Cumulative Effect Of The Errors In Ms. Maynard's Case Requires Reversal Of Her 
Convictions 
Ms. Maynard asserts that, even if this Court determines that none of the errors 
individually warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of these errors deprived Ms. Maynard 
of her due process right to a fair trial and therefore reversal is required. 
"Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 
230. In this case, there were multiple errors occurring at trial, each one impacting on 
Ms. Maynard's right to a fair trial. Accordingly, Ms. Maynard asserts that the cumulative 
effect of the errors in her case require reversal of her conviction. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. Maynard respectfully requests that this Court reverse her judgments of 
conviction and sentences, and remand her case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 1st day of June, 2012. 
SARAH E. TOM~INS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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